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Notes

Collateral Estoppel in Civil Tax Fraud Cases
Subsequent to Criminal Conviction
To secure compliance with federal income tax laws, Congress
has provided both criminal and civil penalties.' Fines and imprison2
ment are imposed under section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code
if the Government can prove beyond a reasonable doubts a willful

1. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943); United States v. Thompson, 279
TAXATION § 55.01
(rev. ed. Zimet 1964).
2. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 7201 (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 145(b)), reads
in full: "Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the
costs of prosecution." Other criminal sanctions are provided for in §§ 7201-7344 of
the 1954 Code.
3. See Holland v. United States, 209 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 348 U.S. 121 (1954),
rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 932 (1955); Linquata v. United States, 173 F.2d 201 (lst Cir.

F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1960). See generally 10 MAEam__s, FEDERL INCOME
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attempt to evade or defeat taxation. Section 6653(b) 4 authorizes, as
a civil sanction, a fifty per cent addition upon findings by the Commissioner of fraudulent underpayment. These findings, if challenged
by the taxpayer, need only be sustained by a preponderance of the
evidence. 5 Because of the similarity between the acts condemned
by sections 7201 and 6653(b), conviction under section 7201 is frequently followed by a civil addition based on section 6653(b). The
successive application of these sections has given rise to collateral
estoppel problems. 6 Although collateral estoppel operates to preclude relitigation of matters of law and fact actually at issue in a
prior suit between the same parties and upon which the prior judgment ultimately rested, 7 the Government's greater burden of proof
1949). For a comparison of the burden of proof in civil and criminal cases, see United
States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1964); Simon v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869,
876 (8th Cir. 1957).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6653(b) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 293(b)),
reads in part: "(b) Fraud-If any part of any underpayment (as defined in subsection
(c)) of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the
tax an amount equal to 50 percent of the underpayment." Additional civil penalties
are provided for in §§ 6601-6681 of the 1954 Code. Although more than one ad valorem
penalty could be imposed on the same tax liability under the 1939 Code (see Fred N.
Acker, 26 T.C. 107 (1956)), only one of the various civil penalties can be imposed
under the 1954 Code. For example, if the 50% fraud penalty is imposed under
§ 6653(b) of the 1954 Code, the 25% delinquency penalty of § 6651 cannot also be imposed. See INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6653(d).
5. See United States v. De Martini, 53 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Cal. 1943); Ida B.Lewis, 27
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 89 (1958).
6. In addition, subjecting the taxpayer to both criminal and civil penalties has
raised questions of double jeopardy. Although the civil additions for fraud quite often
entail a substantially larger sum than the previously assessed criminal fine for willful
evasion (see, e.g., Abraham Teitelbaum, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 55 (1960); Vincent
Cefalu, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 131 (1958), afJ'd, 276 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1960); Jolly's
Motor Livery Co., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 886 (1957)), the Supreme Court has held that
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause is not violated. Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938). See Kenney v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1940); cf.
Inman v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 784 (W.D.S.C. 1957). See generally 1959 DuKE L.J.
146.
7. The term "res judicata" embraces two related concepts which are not always
dearly distinguished. First, when there is a final judgment on the merits, parties to the
suit and their privies are bound in a subsequent suit on the same cause of action as
to every matter which actually was or could have been litigated. See McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1963); Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 509 (5th Cir.
1958); The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720
(1944). See generally 25 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 480 (1952); 104 U. PA. L. Rxv. 955 (1956).
The two branches of this first doctrine are merger and bar. If the plaintiff prevails, the
cause of action merges into the judgment and is extinguished. See Commissioner V.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Filice v. United States, 271 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 924 (1960). If the plaintiff loses, a final judgment on the merits
bars any future suit on the same cause of action. See Tait v. Western Maryland Ry.,
289 U.S. 620 (1933); Taylor v. Anderson, 303 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1962). Since proceedings
under §§ 7201 and 6653(b) constitute separate causes of action, merger and bar are
unavailable to either the government or the taxpayer in the subsequent civil dispute.
See Helvering v. Mitchell, supra note 6; John W. Amos, 43 T.C. 50 (1964); Eugene Vassallo, 23 T.C. 656 (1955).
The second concept embraced by res judicata, commonly termed "collateral estop-
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in a section 7201 criminal prosecution prevents the taxpayer from
maintaining that an acquittal under section 7201 should preclude
a section 6653(b) civil penalty." As the Supreme Court has pointed
out, failure to prove a violation beyond a reasonable doubt should
not estop the Government to attempt to prove one by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 However, when a taxpayer is convicted in
the criminal prosecution, the question of whether collateral estoppel
should be applied in a subsequent civil suit has caused a recent split
of judicial opinion. Collateral estoppel was applied ,inTomlinson
v. Lefkowitz'0 and John W. Amos," but not in Moore v. United
2
States.'1
To apply collateral estoppel in a section 6653(b) civil tax fraud
case following a section 7201 criminal conviction, it is necessary
to establish that proof of a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax
required by section 7201 encompasses proof of fraud within the
meaning of section 6653(b). The courts in Amos and Tomlinson
squarely confronted this task, citing considerable authority 3 tending
pel," is broader in some respects than merger and bar because it applies to suits on
a different cause of action. However, in other respects it is narrower than merger and
bar since-it operates to preclude litigation only of matters of law and fact which were
actually at issue in a prior suit and upon which the prior judgment ultimately rested.
See McCall v. Commissioner, supra; Hyman v. Regenstein, supra at 509-11; The Evergreens v. Nunan, supra. See generally Branscomb, Collateral Estoppel in Tax CasesStatic and Separable Facts, 37 TExAs L. R~v. 584 (1959); Lore, Res Judicata in the Tax
Laws, 34 TAxEs 455 (1956); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39
IowA L. REv. 217 (1954); Note, 35 IoWA L. Rav. 700 (1950).
In the leading case of The Evergreens v. Nunan, supra, Judge Learned Hand first
promulgated the "ultimate fact-mediate datum" test followed by the Restatement of
Judgments, § 68. Judge Hand stated that collateral estoppel should apply only to
"those facts, upon whose combined occurrence the law raises the duty, or the right,
in question [the ultimate facts]." Mediate data-facts "from whose existence may be
rationally inferred the existence of [ultimate facts]"--should not call into play collateral estoppel. The Evergreens v. Nunan, supra, at 928. Judge Hand also maintained
that collateral estoppel should apply only to ultimate facts in the second suit as well,
because otherwise "what jural relevance facts may acquire in the future . . . is often
impossible even remotely to anticipate." Id. at 929. The latter concept has not been
so widely accepted as the former. See United States v. Cathcard, 70 F. Supp. 653 (D.
Neb. 1946). The "ultimate fact" doctrine was accepted by the Supreme Court in Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 338 (1957). See generally Polasky, supra, at 237-39.
Generally, the United States, the Commissioner, and District Directors of Internal
Revenue are considered as one "party" so as to make a decision affecting one binding
on all. See Tait v. Western Maryland Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933); Edward H. Garcin, 22
B.T.A. 1027 (1931).
For a discussion of the effect of consent judgments in tax cases, see 52 MIcH. L. Ray.

303 (1953).
8. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Johnson v. Wall, 329 F.2d
149 (4th Cir. 1964); Lias v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956).
9. See Helvering v. Mitchell, supra note 8.
10. 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
11. 43 T.C. 50 (1964). This case overruled Meyer J. Safra, 30 T.C. 1026 (1958).
12. 14 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5612 (W.D. Va. 1964).
13. See, e.g., Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943); Bloch v. United States, 221
F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1955); Wardlaw v. United States, 203 F.2d 884, 885 (5th Cir.
1953); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1941).
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to support their conclusion that, the term "willfully" as used in section 7201 had been judicially defined to embrace all of the elements

of section 6653(b) fraud.14 In addition, the Tomlinson court cited
cases involving proceedings to deport persons convicted of willful
tax evasion which held that the equivalent of an intent to defraud the United States must be proved in section 7201 criminal
prosecutions. 15
The courts applying collateral estoppel could have buttressed
their position with three additional arguments. First, section 6653(b)
fraud is not common-law fraud, but rather a statutory fraud, inferable from any conduct calculated to mislead or conceal; 16 it is
difficult to envision any willful attempt to evade or defeat payment
of taxes which would not fall within this broad concept. Second,
it has been judicially established that an indictment for willful
evasion under section 7201 must allege a specific intent to defraud
the Government. 7 Third, it has been held that the intent which
14. "'Willfully' within the purview of section 7201, comprehends a specific intent
involving the bad purpose and evil motive to evade or defeat the payment of tax."
John W. Amos, 43 T.C. 50, 55 (1964). A specific intent involving an evil motive to
evade seems equivalent to fraud. See Spies v. United States, supra note 13; Bloch v.
United States, supra note 13; Wardlaw v. United States, supra note 13.
The leading case of Spies v. United States, supra note 13, held that a simple failure
to file a return did not bring one within § 145(b) (the 1939 Code predecessor of § 7201);
some overt act was necessary. The Spies case was followed in United States v. Croessant,
178 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 927 (1950): "There is substance . . ,
in distinguishing between failing to file a return and knowingly filing a false one....
The law has always distinguished between failing to disclose useful information and
making a disclosure which is a lie." Id. at 97. Accord, Reynolds v. United States, 288
F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1961). The essential similarity between the criminal and civil sanctions
was further demonstrated when the Spies doctrine was held applicable to civil fraud
cases in Cirillo v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1963).
Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1962), declared that under § 7201
a willful and knowing attempt to evade the payment of tax (such as making certain
that money acquired does not go to pay a previously assessed tax) can be different
from a willful and knowing attempt to defeat the tax (such as the use of false returns
or double books). If that distinction is valid, it is possible that evading payment
under § 7201 does not necessarily imply fraud within the purview of § 6653(b).
For cases discussing § 7201 and its predecessors in terms of fraud, see United
States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958); Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284
(Ist Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951); cf. Blauner v. United States, 293 F.2d
723 (8th Cir. 1961); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.
1957).
15. See Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957); Chanan Din Khan v.
Barber, 147 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.]). Cal. 1957), aff'd, 253 F2d 547 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958).
16. See 10 MrarENs, op. cit. supra note 1, § 55.09, at 36.
17. See Elwert v. United States, 231 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1956), in which the defendant
in a criminal prosecution under § 145(b) of the 1939 Code-the predecessor of § 7201maintained that the indictment was insufficient because it failed to allege a specific
intent to defraud the Government. The court held the indictment sufficient because
Elwert failed to show that he was prejudiced, although it agreed that a specific intent
to defraud must be proved. "The requirement of such a specific intent resulted from
an interpretation of the word 'willfully' in Section 145(b) and imposed on the United
States a more difficult burden of proof than is normally required in a criminal case."
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must be proved to establish section 6653(b) fraud is the "specific
purpose to evade."' 8 The predecessor in the 1939 Code of section 6653(b) expressly utilized the phrase "fraud with intent to
evade tax," and there is no indication that its deletion from the
1954 Code was intended to effect a substantive change. 19
Before the arguments supporting the application of collateral
estoppel could be deemed decisive, however, the court in Amos was
forced to distinguish a Supreme Court case, United Statesov. Scharton,2 0 which was heavily relied upon in Moore as authority for holding collateral estoppel inapplicable. 2 1 In Scharton, the defendant was
indicted under a statute22 essentially identical to section 7201 more
than three but less than six years after an alleged willful tax evasion.
At issue was the applicability of a clause extending the three-year
statute of limitations to six years for "offenses involving the defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States." 23 The Government
contended that the statute of limitations should be extended because
willful evasion necessarily includes every element of fraud. The
Supreme Court never squarely faced this contention, but decided
that the extension clause should not apply because it was "an excepting clause and therefore to be narrowly construed." 24 Thus,
the Court did not hold in Scharton that the elements comprising willful evasion do not embrace the components of fraud. Moreover, as the Amos court noted, Scharton's restrictive approach to
statutory construction has since been rejected by the Supreme
Court.

25

Id. at 931. The court asserted that "this requirement has crystalized only in recent
years," thus rendering doubtful prior authority holding it sufficient to frame an indictment in the language of § 145(b). Compare Bloch v. United States, 221 F.2d 786, 788
(9th Cir. 1955), with Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
286 U.S. 553 (1932).
18. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941); see Powell v.
Granquist, 252 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1958); Eagle v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 635, 637
(5th Cir. 1957); In the Matter of Parr, 205 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Texas 1962).
19. See 10 MRnr.Ns, op. cit. supra note 1, § 55.09 n.83.5.
20. 285 U.S. 518 (1932).
21. Language from another distinguishable case, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591 (1948), was also relied upon by the dissenters in Amos to support their conclusion that collateral estoppel was inapplicable. In Sunnen, the Supreme Court
declared that collateral estoppel "must be confined to situations where the matter
raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first
proceeding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged." Id. at 599-600. This statement, however, viewed in context, is not aimed at
formal differences in statutory language. The Court in Sunnen was concerned with
the possibility of a prior decision becoming obsolete by an evolution or change in
legal doctrine. This justifiable concern is not relevant to an application of collateral
estoppel between §§ 7201 and 6653(b) if the sections' constituent elements are deemed
identical. The change which concerned the Sunnen Court was a change in substantive
law and not legal language. Cf. Jones v. Trapp, 186 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1950).
22. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1114(b), 44 Stat. 116.
23. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1110(a), 44 Stat. 115.
24. United States v. Scharton, 285 US. 518, 521-22 (1932).
25. See United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235 (1953).
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Although the Amos and Tomlinson courts demonstrated that
collateral estoppel can be applied in the subsequent action under
section 6653(b), in concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied these courts failed to analyze correctly the relevant policy
considerations. One of the primary justifications for applying collateral estoppel is the possibility of effecting a marked saving of judicial time.26 However, application of collateral estoppel in this instance wII not accomplish that result. While it is, true that proof
of fraud or tax exasion can require an exhaustive compilation of
the taxpayer's every item of income and expense for an entire year,
and that careful consideration of this evidence involves many judicial man-hours,2 7 collateral estoppel applies only to findings of fact
upon which the prior conviction necessarily rests. While some defi, ciency must be proved to establish a willful evasion under section
7201,28 the exact amount need not. Therefore, even though the taxpayer is collaterally estopped to relitigate the issue of fraud in a
subsequent section 6653(b) dispute, the exact deficiency to which
the fifty per cent penalty will attach is still subject to litigation. 2
Thus, whether or not collateral estoppel is applied, the court must
reexamine the voluminous evidence.
A second consideration underlying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is the policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal
relations.30 Certainty, however, must give way if a party is unfairly
burdened. Therefore, the argument by an Amos dissenter that application of collateral estoppel is unfair because it gives the Government the benefit of a "one-way street" is quite persuasive.3 1 As
noted before, when the taxpayer-defendant is acquitted in a prosecution under section 7201, the difference in burdens of proof prevents
his pleading collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil suit. The
potential inequities of this one-sided availability are best illustrated
by William Hendrick,3 2 in which a poorly educated immigrant waiter
who failed to report his income from tips pleaded guilty in a criminal
prosecution in order to permit prompt conclusion at minimum legal
expense. He was fined $250 and put on probation for six months.
Subsequently, he was confronted by the Commissioner with an
addition of approximately $1500, a sum certainly not in contem26. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
27. See, e.g., Abraham Teitelbaum, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 55 (1960); Vincent Cefalu,
27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 131 (1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1960); Jolly's Motor Livery
Co., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 886 (1957).

28. See Swallow v. United States, 307 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Fronek, 231 F. Supp. 8 (W.D. Pa. 1964). But cf. Funkhouser v. United States, 260 F.2d
86 (4th Cir. 1958).
29. See Moore v. United States, 14 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5612 (W.D. Va. 1964).
30. See The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944); Polasky, supra
note 7, at 250.
31. John W. Amos, 43 T.C. 50, 64 (1964) (Pierce, J., dissenting).
32. 80 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1786 (1961).
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plation when he pleaded guilty. The court, acknowledging the taxpayer's motive for pleading guilty, gave no weight to the prior conviction, and was able to hold that there had been no fraud. Of
course, if collateral estoppel had been held applicable, the court
would have been precluded from reexamining the prior conviction.
Such an application of collateral estoppel would in effect force defendants to engage in expensive criminal litigation even when the
anticipated punishment does not merit it. Moreover, even if the
defendant prevailed after this otherwise unwarranted expense, he
would still be potentially subject to the expense of a civil proceeding.
Thus, a defendant situated as was Hendrick would be, in effect,
33
forced to defend twice against the civil addition.
Finallj, the application of collateral estoppel will virtually eliminate the taxpayer's choice of forum. Normally, the taxpayer may
elect to contest a civil addition in the Tax Court, the Court of
Claims, or a federal district court. This choice will depend on such
factors as financial resources, desirability of expert fact-finding, and
variances among courts in construction of the Code.34 If col-

33. This unjust result could be partially mitigated by the free granting of the
plea of nolo contendere in § 7201 prosecutions. Such a plea would prevent any
mention of a § 7201 conviction in a subsequent § 6653(b) civil proceeding. See Mickler
v. Fahs, 243 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1957) (mention of a former nolo contendere plea in a
§ 6653(b) civil proceeding held prejudicial error requiring reversal of a judgment for
the Commissioner); cf. B. Frank Wells, Jr., 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 684 (1958). But see
Broadhead v. Enochs, 162 F. Supp. 897, 899 (1958) ("r[]he plea of nolo contendere has

very little, if any, weight.'). See generally Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451
(1926). FED. R. Camm. P. 11 provides that nolo contendere is available only at the
discretion of the court; the Department of Justice may be counted upon to
resist it. See Ferguson, JurisdictionalProblems in Federal Tax Controversies, 48 IowA
L. REv. 312, 322 (1963). Nevertheless, a liberal approach to its use has been urged. See
United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Cal. 1954). "Defendants claim a potential of civil litigation based upon the same transactions pleaded in the indictment.
They tell the Court that they are willing not to contend against the charges but
desire not to create evidence which could be used as an admission in other potential
litigation. To avoid exacting an admission which could be so used, is the main,
if not only, modern purpose of nolo contendere." Id. at 290. But see United States v.
Bagliore, 182 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the court stated that no other
authorities could be found to support the liberal approach of Jones.
Even if nolo contendere is henceforth readily available, however, the basic concept
of mutuality of estoppel would seem to be violated. Strictly construed, the doctrine of
mutuality prevents a party from invoking collateral estoppel unless he would have
been bound if the prior judgment had gone the other way. See Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955). Therefore, when the Government seeks to
utilize § 7201 criminal convictions to preclude relitigation of the fraud issue, it
would seem that collateral estoppel should not be applied because the defendant could
not so utilize an acquittal because of the different burdens of proof. Nevertheless, it is
clear that in federal courts collateral estoppel will operate between a criminal conviction and a civil dispute if the parties are the same. See United States v. Rubin, 243
F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1957); Lentin v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956). See generally lB MOORE, FEDEAL PRACrIC § 0.418[1] (2d
ed. 1965).
34. See Brrraxa, FEDERAL INCOME EsATF. & G-r TAXATION 934-43 (3d ed. 1964);
Ferguson, supra note 33.
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lateral estoppel is applied, the taxpayer will, in effect, be limited
to the district courts, where the criminal actions are prosecuted. In
view of the potential complexities of tax cases, it is indeed arguable
that collateral estoppel should not be allowed to preclude a choice
available to all other tax litigants. This, coupled with the double
burden placed upon the taxpayer in exchange for a negligible saving
in judicial time, suggests that collateral estoppel, while technically
applicable, should not operate between section 7201 and section
6653(b) proceedings.

